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This paper brings out the special mechanism through which taxes influence bilateral FDI, when
investment decisions are two-fold in the presence of fixed setup flows costs.  For each pair of source-
host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate FDI flows will occur at all, and
a different set of factors determining the volume of FDI flows (provided they occur).  We develop
a two-country tax competition model which yield an asymmetric Nash-equilibrium with high
corporate tax rate and high level of public good provision in the rich source country for FDI outflows
and with low corporate tax rate and low level of public good provision in the poor host country for
FDI outflows.  This is akin to the asymmetry among the EU 15 and EU 10 in the enlarged European
Union, as of 2004. We also demonstrate that the notion that the mere international tax differentials
are a key factor behind the direction and magnitude of FDI flows, the traditional race to the bottom
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"European countries have been steadily slashing corporate-tax rates
as they vie for foreign investment, potentially adding to pressure on
the U.S. for similar cuts as it weighs a tax overhaul. Following the
lead of Ireland, which dropped its rates to 12.5% from 24% between
2000 and 2003, one nation after another has moved toward ﬂatter,
lower corporate rates with fewer loopholes" (Wall Street Journal
Europe, January 28-30, 2005).1,2
Indeed, the economic literature has extensively dealt with the eﬀects of tax-
ation on investment, going back to the well-known works of Harbeger (1962)
and Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Of particular interest in this era of increasing
globalization are the eﬀects of international diﬀerences in tax rates on foreign
direct investment (FDI); see, for instance, Auerbach and Hassett (1993), Hines
(1999), Desai and Hines (2001), De Mooij and Ederveen (2001), and Devereux
and Hubbard (2003).
In this paper (1) we attempt to provide a new look at the mechanisms
through which corporate tax rates inﬂuence aggregate FDI ﬂows; (2) we develop
and simulate a model of tax competition.
We assume "lumpy" setup costs for new investment. This speciﬁcation,
which has been recently supported empirically by Caballero and Engel (1999,
2000), creates a situation in which FDI decisions are two-fold: whether to export
FDI at all, and, if so, how much. These decisions are pair-wise: that is, they are
made by each source country with respect to each host country, as the "lumpy"
cost is speciﬁc for each source-host pair. In this context, the source and host
tax rates may have diﬀerent eﬀects on these two decisions.
We begin with the observation that there are in fact no investment ﬂows for
many source-host pair countries, as indeed our lumpy setup cost model suggests.
We employ a Heckman estimation approach to ask which source-host pairs have
any investment at all and to investigate which are the determinants of these
ﬂows in those pairs that have. We employ panel data for OECD countries for
the period 1981 to 1998.3
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is an introduc-
tion.Section 3 provides a simple conceptual framework for the analysis of the
eﬀects of taxation on two-fold FDI decisions. Section 4 presents the data and
empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 develops a model of tax competition. Section 6
reports on the simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
1In fact, Ireland had during the 1990’s corporate tax rates of only 10% on certain activities.
Under pressure from the EU, it has limited the applicability of this low rate to certain regimes
(e.g. the Shanon Free Zone).
2The tax rate was 28% in 1999.
3For a recent survey of the empirical literature about the determinants (including taxes)
of FDI, see Blonigen (2005).
23 Source and Host Taxation
Elsewhere (Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004)) we emphasize the two-fold
nature of investment decisions. In the presence of ﬁxed setup costs of new
investment, a ﬁrm determines how much to invest according to the standard
marginal productivity conditions. For this decision, the setup costs play no role.
But in the presence of ﬁxed setup costs, the proﬁts, that are generated when the
ﬁrm carries out the amount of investment called for by marginal productivity
conditions, may be negative. Therefore, the ﬁrm faces also a decision whether
to incur the setup costs and invest at all. Thus, the investment decision of the
ﬁrm is two-fold: whether to invest at all, and if so, how much to invest. Indeed,
in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004) we provide evidence in support of this
two-fold mechanism of investment in the context of foreign direct investment.
Looking at aggregate FDI inﬂows and outﬂows among all potential source-host
pairs of OECD countries, we ﬁnd a large proportion of such pairs with no
FDI ﬂows at all. Following the two-fold decision mechanism, we accordingly
estimate jointly a selection equation (whether to invest all) and a ﬂow equation
(how much to invest). The estimation results point out to the importance of
ﬁxed setup costs of new investments for the determination of aggregate FDI
ﬂows.
Consider for concreteness the case of a parent ﬁrm that weighs the develop-
ment of a new product line. We can think of the ﬁxed setup costs as the costs
of developing the product line. The ﬁrm may choose to make the development
at home and then carry the production at a subsidiary abroad. This choice may
be determined by some "genuine" economic considerations such as source-host
diﬀerences in labor costs, in infrastructure, in human capital, etc. But it may
also be inﬂuenced by tax considerations. Of course, the ﬁxed setup cost is not
limited only to R&D, but may include also the cost of orientation in a foreign
country - such as learning and adopting a new language, a new judicial system,
a set of new political norms and institutions, etc.
In this context of FDI, there arises the issue of double taxation. The income
of a foreign aﬃliate is typically taxed by the host country. If the source country
taxes this income too, then the combined (double) tax rate may be very high,
and even exceeds 100%4. This double taxation is typically relieved at the source
country by either exempting foreign-source income altogether or granting tax
credits5. In the former case, foreign-source income is subject to the tax levied
by the host country only. When the source country taxes its resident on their
world-wide income and grants full credit for foreign taxes, then in principle
the foreign-source income is taxed at the source-country tax rate, so that the
host-country tax rate becomes irrelevant for investment decisions in the source
country. But, in practice, foreign-source income is far from being taxed at the
source country rate. First, there are various reduced tax rates for foreign-source
income. Second, foreign-source income is usually taxed only upon repatriation,
4For a succinct review of this issue see, for example, Hines(2001).
5This is also the recommendation of the OECD model tax treaty (OECD, 1997). A similar
recommendation is made also by the United Nations model tax treaty (U.N. 1980).
3thereby eﬀectively reducing the present value of the tax.6 Thus, in practice, the
host country tax-rate is much relevant for investment decisions of the parent
ﬁrm at the source country. The relevance of the host-country tax rate intensiﬁes
through transfer pricing.
To highlight the issue of source-host diﬀerences in tax rates, suppose that the
source country does not tax foreign-source income at all. Denote the ﬁxed cost
of development by c. Now, if the host-country tax rate is lower than that of the
source country, then the parent ﬁrm at the source country attempts to keep this
cost at home for tax purposes. (Furthermore, there may exist some jointness
to the product which enables the parent ﬁrm to produce it in multiple markets,
once it is created, so that the source country may be crucial in the development
process.) The ﬁrm may thus charge its subsidiary artiﬁcially low royalties for
the right to produce the new product. Thus, this cost remains largely deductible
in the high-tax source country. Denote the (maximized) present value of the
cash ﬂows arising from the production and sale of the new product by v(τH);a s
explained above, it depends (negatively) on the corporate tax rate (τH) levied
by the host country. Thus, the parent ﬁrm will indulge into the project if
c(1 − τS) ≤ v(τH),
where τS is the corporate tax rate in the source country7.
As is evident from condition (1), the tax rate in the source country, τS,
aﬀects positively the decision by a parent ﬁrm in country S whether to carry a
foreign direct investment in country H; whereas the tax rate in the host country,
τH, has a negative eﬀect on this decision.
The amount of foreign direct investment is determined by the standard mar-
ginal productivity conditions derived from the maximization of the present value
of the cash ﬂows of the foreign subsidiary, after taxes paid in the host country.
Therefore, the tax rate in host country (τH) has a negative eﬀect on the ﬂow of
FDI from S to H; whereas the tax rate in the source country (τS) is irrelevant
for the determination of the magnitude of their ﬂows.
4 Empirical Evidence
In the dataset there are H-S pairs for which no FDI ﬂows appear in the data
(covering 18 years). This probably indicates that the FDI ﬂows called for by
the standard marginal productivity conditions are not large enough to surpass
a certain threshold level as the one described in condition (1), rather than that
the desired ﬂows, in the absence of a threshold, are actually zero. The tradi-
tional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods treat the no-ﬂow observations as
6See also Hines and Rice (1994) for a detailed discussion of the beneﬁt of tax deferral.
7When the tax-allowed depreciation is close to the true physical (or economic) depreciation,
investments are ﬁnanced primarily by debt, then v(τH) may be approximated by (1−τH)v0,
where v0 is the pre-tax present value of the cash ﬂows of the subsidiary; see, for instance,
Auerbach (2002), and Hasset and Hubbard (1996). In this case, condition (1) is approximated
by c[1−(τS−τH)] 5 v0 , where we note that (1−τS)/(1−τH) is approximated by 1−(τS−τH).
4either literally indicating zero ﬂows, and assign a value of zero for the FDI in
these observations, or discard these observations altogether. In both cases the
estimates are biased.8
We employ 3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting
of 3 years). The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country charac-
teristics, such as GDP or GDP per-capita, population, educational attainment
(as measured by average years of schooling), language, ﬁnancial risk ratings,
etc.; (2) S-H source-host pair, characteristics, such as S-H FDI ﬂows, geograph-
ical distance, common language (zero-one variable), S-H ﬂows of goods, bilat-
eral telephone traﬃc per-capita as a proxy for informational distance, etc.; (3)
corporate-tax rates9. Table 1 describes the list of the 24 countries in the sample,
and whether they are observed in the sample (at least once) as a source or host
country (but most source countries do not have positive ﬂows more than with
few host countries), and Table 2 describes the data sources.
T h ed a t ae m p l o y e di nt h ee m p i r i c a la n a l y s i sa r ed r a w nf r o mO E C Dr e p o r t s
(OECD, various years) on a sample of 24 OECD countries, over the period from
1981 to 1998. The FDI data are based on the OECD reports of FDI exports
from 17 OECD source countries to 24 OECD host countries10.
4.1 Baseline Results
Table 1 describes the data sources. Table 2 presents the eﬀects of several po-
tential explanatory variables of the two-fold decisions on FDI ﬂows (baseline
estimates). Our focus is on the role of the source and host corporate-tax rates.
We analyze country-pair shocks as we use aggregate country-pair data.11
But we naturally include in the empirical analysis a host of standard ex-
planatory/control variables that are employed in studies of the determination
of FDI ﬂows. We brieﬂy discuss these determinants ﬁrst. They are analyzed in
details in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004). These variables includes stan-
dard "mass" variables (the source and the host population sizes); "distance"
variables (physical distance between the source and host countries and whether
or not the two countries share a common language); and "economic" variables
(source and host GDP per capita, source-host diﬀerences in average years of
schooling, and source and host ﬁnancial risk ratings). In addition, we include a
dummy variable (previous FDI) to indicate whether or not the source-host pair
of countries have already established FDI relations between them in the past;
8See Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004) and Razin, Sadka and Tong (2005).
9We simply apply the statutory rates, because they are exogenously given. Average ef-
fective tax rates, suggested by Deverux and Griﬃth (2003) as determinants of the location
of investments, are endogenous in the sense that they are determined by the amount of in-
vestment. To apply econometrically average eﬀective tax rates, there is a need for a good
instrument. The statutory rate is the best available instrument.
10The OECD reports accurately on all rich and poor countries that are a host to OECD
FDI exports. But data are missing for non-OECD countries as a source of FDI exports. This
is the reason that we restrict our sample to the group of OECD countries, as potential source
and host countries, among themselves, with no missing data.
11For an analysis of micro-data see, e.g., Devereux and Griﬃth (1998).
5such past relations may have some bearing on the setup costs of establishing a
new relation. Also, as in other international cross-section studies as well, there
is the issue of endogeneity between some or all of the explanatory variables and
the dependent variables. In our case, for example, some weak macroeconomic
fundamentals in a host country may lead simultaneously to low FDI ﬂows and
tax rates. As ﬁnding appropriate instruments may be impossible or certainly
hard, we follow the common procedure of handling the endogeneity issue by
including country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
As explained in detail in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004), the OLS
estimates of the eﬀects of these variables are biased. This is true for both
the OLS-D regression, where the observations with no FDI ﬂows are discarded
(leaving only 851 observations out of the 2116 observations in the full sample);
and for the OLS-Zero regressions, where the no-ﬂow observations were recorded
as having FDI ﬂows of zero12. Note that the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients between
OLS-D and OLS-Zero indicate that there exist non linear relationships between
the dependent variable and the independent variables. The Heckman method
is suitable for estimating such non linear relationships. The Heckman joint
estimation of the ﬂow and selection equations are presented in the last two
columns. We exclude certain variables from the ﬂow equation for identiﬁcation.
T h er e s u l t sa r em o r eo rl e s si nl i n ew i t hﬁndings in Razin, Rubinstein and
Sadka (2004). For instance, a high gap in education in favor of the source
country reduces the probability of having FDI ﬂows to the host country. This is
expected because a gap in years of schooling may be a proxy for a productivity
gap; see also Lucas (1990). The host ﬁnancial risk rating aﬀects positively the
ﬂow of FDI, whereas the analogous variable of the source country is negative
and signiﬁcant in the selection equation. Finally, the existence of past FDI
relations is positive and signiﬁcant in the selection equation, as it may help to
reduce the setup costs of establishing a new FDI ﬂow.
We turn now to the eﬀect of corporate-tax rates. First, the source corporate-
tax rate is positive and signiﬁcant in the selection equation, as indeed predicted
by condition (1) of the preceding section. This rate plays no statistically signif-
icant role in the ﬂow equation, again in line with our analysis. The coeﬃcient
of the host corporate-tax rate is indeed negative, although insigniﬁcant in the
selection equation.13,14 But it is negative and signiﬁcant in the ﬂow equation,
12More accurately, as we measured FDI by logs, we put a large negative number for these
FDI ﬂows.
13One may argue that since previous FDI indicates that the ﬁscal environment was accept-
able to the investors before, it may soak up elements of the host’s ﬁscal environment. If host
country taxes change only infrequently, the previous FDI variable may pick up the overall
attractiveness of the country (taxes included), causing the host tax to appear unimportant,
even if it does inﬂuence investment selection. This concern was mitigated in the baseline
estimation, because we employed previous FDI as a dummy variable rather than a contin-
uos (quantity) variable. Furthermore, country ﬁxed eﬀects, that we employed, soak up the
correlation of the host tax rate with the country overall ﬁscal environment.
14T ot h ee x t e n tt h a ts o m es o u r c ec o u n t r yi nt h es a m p l ed oe ﬀectively tax foreign source
income, granting credits for foreign taxes paid, the host-country tax looses its importance.
This may provide an alternative explanation for the absence of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
host-country corporate tax rate in the selection equation.
6again as predicted by our analysis. Note that it is not merely the source-host
tax diﬀerential (τS − τH) which is the main determinant of FDI ﬂows.
Interestingly, the role of the source and host corporate-tax rates is not prop-
erly revealed by the traditional OLS regressions. In the ﬁrst regression (OLS-D),
only the host corporate-tax rate plays a statistically signiﬁcant role in reducing
FDI ﬂows to the host country; whereas in the other regression (OLS-Zero), it is
only the source corporate-tax rate which plays a statistically signiﬁcant role in
promoting FDI outﬂows from the source country. Thus, OLS analysis does not
detect a role for both tax rates to play in the determination of FDI.
4.2 Robustness
In this section we perform several robustness tests.
First, other empirical work on FDI has relied on variants of gravity equa-
tions, which include the GDP of the host and source countries. Home and
host GDP are also key regressors in the FDI estimation framework carried by
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), or the slightly modiﬁed version proposed
by Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003). Since rich and often high tax countries
were responsible for much of the FDI activity over the period analyzed here, the
positive coeﬃcient on source country taxes may possibly reﬂect investor size.
We therefore replace in Table 3, panel (a) the host and source GDP per capita
and population size by the host and source GDP. The eﬀects on FDI of the host
and source corporate tax rates are intact: the source tax rate has a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the selection equation, whereas the host tax rate has a
negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the ﬂow equation. Also, the coeﬃcients of
the host and source GDP are insigniﬁcant. (The coeﬃcients of the host popu-
lation, as a size variable, was signiﬁcant in the baseline estimations - negative
in the ﬂow equation and positive in the selection equation.)
The selection equation includes two variables (previous FDI dummy and
source country risk rating) that are not included in the ﬂow equation, as a
device for identifying the selection equation. Indeed, a lack previous FDI may
serve as a proxy for the existence and magnitude of ﬁxed setup costs. We
therefore included a dummy for previous FDI ﬂow in the selection equation, but
not in the ﬂow equation. As a robustness test, we included also the previous
FDI dummy in the ﬂow equation. The results are reported in Table 3, panel
(b). Indeed, the coeﬃcient of the previous FDI dummy is insigniﬁcant in the
ﬂow equation. Our main results concerning the host and source corporate tax
rates remain intact.
A further robustness test with respect to the previous FDI as an exclusion
restriction variables is reported in Table 3, panel (c). We replace the previous
FDI dummy by previous FDI stock. Due to a lack of suﬃcient data on FDI
stocks, the sample size reduces from 2116 to just 1036 observations. Even in this
smaller sample (with a diﬀerent restriction exclusion variable), our main results
remain intact: the coeﬃcient of the source tax rate is positive and signiﬁcant in
the selection equation, whereas the host tax rate is negative and signiﬁcant in
the ﬂow equation.
7The results of another robustness test are reported in Table 3, panel (d).
We added the lagged host and source tax rates to both the ﬂow and selection
equations. The lagged tax variables prove to be signiﬁcant, underscoring the
importance of the contemporaneous tax variables; as in the baseline case.
We also include country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in order to control for selection
and time-invariant heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 3, panel (e).
The eﬀects of source and host corporate tax rates remain as in the baseline case:
the coeﬃcient of the source tax rate is positive and signiﬁcant in the selection
equation, but much lower and insigniﬁcant in the ﬂow equation; whereas the
coeﬃcient of the host tax rate is negative and signiﬁcant in the ﬂow equation,
but insigniﬁcant in the selection equation.
Table 1: Data Sources
Variables: Source:
Import of Goods Direction of Trade Statistics,I M F
FDI Inﬂows International Direct Investment Database,O E C D
Unit Value of Manufactured Exports World Economic Outlook,I M F
Population International Financial Statistics,I M F
Distance Shang Jin Wel’s Website: www.nber.org/~wei
Bilateral Telephone Traﬃc Direction of Traﬃc:
Trends in International Telephone Tariﬀs,
International Communication Union
International Telecommunication Union
Educational Attainment Barro-Lee Dataset: www.nber.org/N....
ICRG Index of Financially Sound Ashoka Mody, IMF
Ratings (inverse of ﬁnancial risk)
Corporate Tax Rates World Tax Database (University of Michigan)
http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/worldtaxdatabase.htm
8Table 2: The Eﬀects of Host and Source Corporate-Tax Rates on
FDI: Baseline Estimates
OLS Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection











































































Number of Observations 851 2116 2116 2116
Notes:
(a) All estimations include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects
(b) Robust standard errors appear in parentheses
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent level;
∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the one percent level;
1 In fractions
2 In logs, lagged one period
3 In average years of schooling, lagged one period
4 One for common language; zero otherwise
5 In logs
6 Lagged one period
7 One for existence of previous FDI; zero otherwise
9Table 3: The Eﬀects of Host and Source Corporate-Tax Rates on
FDI: Robustness Tests
(a) GDP as a size variable
OLS Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection
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Source Real GDP per capita










































Number of Observations 851 2116 2116 2116
*signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%
10(b) Lagged FDI dummy included in the ﬂow and selection equa-
tions
OLS Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection
















































































Number of Observations 851 2116 2116 2116
*signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%
11(c) Lagged FDI ﬂo w sa sa ne x c l u s i o nr e s t r i c t i o n
OLS Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection
















































































Number of Observations 747 2116 834 834
*signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%
12(d) Contemporaneous and lagged tax rates
OLS Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection




























































































Number of Observations 851 2116 2116 2116
*signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%
13(e) Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects
OLS Heckman Estimation
OLS-D OLS-Zero Flow Selection














































































Number of Observations 851 2116 2116 2116
*signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%
5 A Source-Host Country Model of Tax Com-
petition
In this section we draw on the preceding sections to shed some light on various
aspects of international tax competition concerning the ﬂows of FDI. Specif-
ically, we take another look at the implication of FDI for eﬀects of taxation
the tax taxes in a source-host country setup. We analyze in the preceding
sections the asymmetric mechanisms trough which source and host taxation
aﬀect FDI. Here we analyze this asymmetry to explain the endogenous coex-
istence of high-tax, high public expenditure source countries and low-tax,low
public expenditure host countries. Such diﬀerences may be a characteristic in
the enlarged European Union between the old members countries and the new
accession countries.
5.1 Production
Consider a host country with a continuum of ﬁrms, each with a productivity
level factor of ε,w h e r eε>−1; the density and the ?? distribution functions
14are denoted, respectively, by g and G. We normalize the number of ﬁrms to
one. Unlike in chapter 3, the productivity factor is not random. It is random to
all before any economics decision is made. Firms are then ex ante and ex post
diﬀerent in their productivity levels.
Assume for simplicity that the initial stock of capital of the ﬁrm is zero.
Firms with a productivity factor ε (an ε-ﬁrm) employs a capital stock of K in
the ﬁrst period produces an output of AHF(K)(1 + ε) in the second period,
where F exhibits a ??? marginal product of capital (F0 > 0,Fj < 0). As
before, there are setup costs of new investment. Therefore, only ﬁrms with a
productivity factor above some threshold level (ε0) will make new investments.
That foreign direct investors (from the source country) have a cutting edge
advantage over domestic inventors with respect to these setup costs, so that
they acquire control over the domestic ﬁrms in the host country.
Foreign direct investors compete among themselves for these ﬁrms. There-
fore, the price they pay for an ε-ﬁrm (with ε ≥ ε0) to the original domestic




AHF(K)(1 + ε)(1 − τH)+τHδ
0






where c∗ is the setup cost born by the foreign direct investor. As before, this cost
is born in the source country and tax-deducted there. The parameters δ and δ
0
H
denote as before the physical and the tax rate of depreciation, respectively, and
τi denotes corporate tax rate in country i = H,S. as explains in the preceding
chapter, the foreign direct investors do not pay any further tax at their home
country. We assume that the two countries are open to the world credit market,
which ﬁxes the rate of interest at r.
The ﬁrst order condition for the optimal stock of capital of an ε-ﬁrm is given
by






for ﬁrms with ε ≥ ε0. This condition deﬁnes the optimal stock of capital of a
ﬁrm as its productivity factor and the host corporate tax rate.
The cutoﬀ level of the productivity factor is a function ε0(τH,τS) of τH and
τS,g i v e nb y :
VH(ε,τH) − (1 − τS)c∗ =0 . ((3))
That is, the ε-ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between investing and not investing. Note that
because of the setup cost advantage of the foreign direct investors, ﬁrms that are
not purchased by these investors will not invest at all under domestic ownership,
and their value is zero. (Recall that the initial stock of capital of the ﬁrm is
zero.)
As we plausibly assume that the depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes
(δ
0
H)i sb e l o wt h et r u ep h y s i c a lr a t e( δ), it follows from equation (2) that τH
15depresses the stock of capital of each investing ﬁrm. It also follows from condi-
tion (3) that τH reduces the number of investing ﬁrms (that is, increases ε0).
Therefore the host corporate tax rate reduces the total stock of capital in the
host country. In contrast, it follows from condition (3) that τS increases the
number of investing ﬁrms (that is, lowers ε0). Therefore, an increase in the
source corporate tax rate raises the capital stock in the host country.
As we are only concerned with FDI ﬂows from the source to the host country,
we do not need to adopt the same richness of the host productive sector in the
source country.15 We thus model the ﬁrms in the source country as homogenous.
Output is AHF(K) for all ﬁrms, where the homogenous productivity factor 1+ε
is already embodied into AS. We also ignore setup costs in the source country.










The optimal stock of capital in the source country is given by the marginal
productivity condition:






This equation yields the optimal stock of capital on a decreasing function
KS(τS) of τS.
5.2 Private Consumption
A representative consumer in country i = S,H has an initial endowment IH in
the ﬁrst period and a utility function
U [V (x1,x 2),P] ((6))
over ﬁrst-period consumption (x1), and second-period consumption (x2), and
public expenditures (P). These expenditures can represent public good provi-
sion. Weak separability is assumed between (x1,x 2) and P, so that the provision
of the public good does not aﬀect private demands for ﬁrst and second-period
consumption. For simplicity, it is assumed that P i incurred in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. Note that we consider purely simplicity, a presentative consumer model,
it is straightforward to extend the public expenditures can reﬂect redistributive
transfers. The tax rate τi applies also to the interest income of the consumers,
both at home and abroad.16 Note that we assume identical preferences in the
two countries; that is the same U and V for the two countries. However, the
identical preferences assumption does not mean that the two countries have a
15For instance, the heterogeneity of ﬁrms in the host country was needed in order for τS to
play a role in the extensive margin of FDI. Speciﬁcally, with homogeneous ﬁrms, ε0 does not
generally change when τS changes.
16Note that we assume that corporate income is taxed only home - at the corporate level.
Each country takes individuals and corporations at the same rate.
16demand for the same quality of the public good (P). This is because they do not
have the same income. We assume that IS is signiﬁcantly higher than IH.T h a t
is, the source country is rich and the host country is poor. Assuming plausibly,
that the public good is a normal good, the rich-source country will have a greater
demand for the public good (namely, for tax revenues) than the poor-host coun-
try. We employ this speciﬁcation in order to single out the cross-country income
gap as the driving force for the ensuing cross-country diﬀerences in tax policy
in the tax competition equilibrium. (For this reason we also speciﬁed the same
production function F for the two countries.)
Utility maximization yields the individual consumption demands for the ﬁrst
and the second periods:
XjXi [Wi,r(1 − τi)] j =1 ,2; i = H,S ((7))
where Wi is the income of a representative consumer in country i. Note that
the demand functions are two identical for the two countries, as we assumed
identical preferences for private goods.
The income of a representative consumer in the host country consists of the
initial endowment, plus the proceeds from the sales of the domestic ﬁrms (with





VH(ε,τH)−(1−τS)C∗ {1 − G[ε0(τH,τS)]} ((8))
Note that the number of ﬁrms within a productivity factor above ε0 is 1−G(ε0).
The income of the representative ﬁrms in the source country (retained by
the representative consumer) is similarly given by
WS(τS)=IS + VS(τS). ((9))
Note that the representative consumer in the source country, who is the foreign
direct inventor in the host country, pays for the purchased price that exhausts
entirely the proﬁts she gets from them. (This follows from the assumed perfect
competition among the foreign direct inventors.
5.3 Government
Each government balances its budget: tax revenues must suﬃce to ﬁnance public
expenditures. This is done overtime in present value terms, given the free access
to the world credit market. By Walras’ law the government’s budget constraint
can be replaced by an economy- w i d er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t .
Consider ﬁrst the host country. The representative consumer sells an ε-ﬁrm
at price VH(ε,τH)−(1−τS)C∗. This price reﬂects the cash ﬂow of the ε-ﬁrms,
after taxes paid to the host country government. However, note that these taxes
17are paid by a ﬁrm owned by foreign investors. Hence, from the point of view
of the host country, the price paid by the foreign direct investors must include
also these taxes (which serve to ﬁnance public expenditures). Put diﬀerently,
the host country extracts from the foreign direct investor the before-tax cash
ﬂow of the purchased ε-ﬁrm, that is (1 + r)−1{AHF[KH(ε,τH)](1 + ε)+( 1−
δ)KH(ε,τH)}−KH(ε,τH)−(1−τS)C∗. Therefore, the economy wide resource









KH(ε,τH)g(ε)dε +( 1− τS)C∗ {1 − G[ε0(τH,τS)]}
PH + X1 [WH(τH,τS)] + (1 + r)−1X2 [WH(τH,τS)].
Note from equation (10) that the source country eﬀectively subsidizes the host
country through the tax deductibility of the ﬁxed setup costs.17 The magni-
tude of this subsidy is τSC∗ {1 − G[ε0(τH,τS)]}. Similarly, the economy wide
resource constraint in source country is given by
IS+(1+r)−1{FH[KS(τS)]+(1−δ)KS(τS)}−τSC∗ {1 − G[ε0(τH,τS)]} ((11))
= PS + KS(τS)+X1 [WS(τS),τS]+( 1+r)−1X2 [WS(τS),τS].
Note again the the source country subsidizes the host country by the amount
of tax deductions allowed for the ﬁxed setup costs.
5.4 Equilibrium
Each government attempts to maximize the welfare of its representative con-
sumer. In doing each government takes the policy of the other government as
given. We thus look at a Nash-equilibrium of the two country tax competition
game.
Formally, the government of the host country chooses τH and PH so as to
maximize
17When the source country does mange to tax the (resident) parent company on its income
from the FDI subsidiary, then it still loses tax revenues to the host country through the foreign
tax credit clause that is usually granted to avoid double taxation.
18U [V {X1 [WH (IH,τH),τH],X 2 [WH (IH,τH),τH])},P H], ((12))
subject to the economy-wide resource constraint (10). The source country rate
(τS) that appears in the latter constraint is considered by the host government
as exogenously given. Similarly, the source government chooses τS and PS so
as to maximize
U [V {X1 [WS (τS),τS],X 2 [WS (τS),τS]},P S], ((13))
subject to the economy-wide resource constraint (11), where τH in the latter
constraint is taken as exogenously given.
We denote the equilibrium policy of the host government by (τ∗
H,P∗
H), and
the equilibrium policy of the source government by (τ∗
S,P∗
S).
6 Host-Source Asymmetric Policies
We resort to some analytics and numerical simulations in order to characterize
the equilibrium and study the eﬀect of the source-host income gap on the
divergence or convergence the tax-expenditure policies. The parameter values
which we use in the simulations are:
g(ε)=0 .5, G(ε)=0 .5+0 .5ε, F(K)=Kα, α ∈ (0,1) and 0 ≤ δ
0
i <δ≤ 1.
The government of the host country solves:
max
τH
{ln(X1,H (WH (τS,τH))) + β ln(X2,H (WH (τS,τH))) + γ ln(PH (τS,τH))}
((14))
where (τS) is considered by the host government as exogenously given. The




























(1 + r)PH (τS,τH)
¸
=0
Similarly, the government of the source country solves:
max
τS
{ln(X1,SWS(τS)) + β ln(X2,SWS(τS)) + γ ln(PS (τS,τH))} ((15))



































The simulations yield a unique asymmetric equilibrium: Rich and Source-FDI
countries have equilibrium high corporate tax rates and high provision of
public goods and services; while Poor and Host-FDI countries have
equilibrium low corporate tax ratesand low provision of public goods and
services. An increase in the ﬁxed cost tends to lower τH and τS.A n

















































7C o n c l u s i o n
Indeed, the 2004 enlargement of the EU with ten new countries provides a styl-
ized analogue of the predictions of the model. Table 4 describes the corporate
tax rates in the 25 EU countries in 2003 in anticipation for the actual enlarge-
ment. It reveals a marked gap between the original EU-15 countries and the
10 accession countries. The latter have signiﬁcantly lower rates. Estonia, for
instance, has no corporate tax; the rates in Cyprus and Lithuania are 15%; and
in Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia, 19%. In contrast, the rates in Belgium, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands range from 33% to 40%.
Table 4 Statutory Corporate Tax Rates in the Enlarged EU, 2003.


























Note: * Denotes a new entrant.
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